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Abstract 
 
Federal tax policy provides a broad array of incentives for energy investment.  I review 
those policies and construct estimates of marginal effective tax rates for different energy 
capital investments as of 2007.  Effective tax rates vary widely across investment classes.  
I then consider investment in wind generation capital and regress investment against a 
user cost of capital measure along with other controls.  I find that wind investment is 
strongly responsive to changes in tax policy.  Based on the coefficient estimates the 
elasticity of investment with respect to the user cost of capital is in the range of -1 to -2.  I 
also demonstrate that the federal production tax credit plays a key role in driving wind 
investment over the past eighteen years. 
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Investment in Energy Infrastructure and the Tax Code 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Investment in new energy capital infrastructure is much in the news these days.  
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 included over $60 billion in 
funds for clean energy investments.  If passed the American Clean Energy and Security 
Act of 2009 will implement a cap and trade system to reduce greenhouse gas emissions – 
nearly 80 percent of which are associated with energy production or consumption – and 
implement a new mandate for renewable electricity with 20 percent to be provided by 
renewable sources by 2020.1  New capital investments are critical to the Administration's 
goals of reducing our reliance on petroleum products and in reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
 The tax code has historically been a significant policy instrument for shaping 
energy decisions in the marketplace. Much attention has been paid to the magnitude of 
federal dollars supporting different energy sources.  A recent study by the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (2008a), for example, estimates that roughly two-thirds of 
tax-subsidies for energy production were received by producers of fossil fuels in 1999 in 
contrast to one-third for producers of renewable energy.  By 2007 the share going to 
renewable producers had risen to nearly forty percent while the share going to fossil fuel 
producers had fallen to less than fifty percent. 
 While much is known about the number and dollar value of tax benefits, 
surprisingly little is known about how the tax code affects investment in energy capital.  
This paper seeks to fill that gap.  I begin by reviewing key energy tax code provisions in 
the next section.  In section III I construct measures of the effective tax rate on various 
                                                 
1  Up to five percent can be provided through energy efficiency improvements.   
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forms of energy capital.  The following section provides an empirical analysis of 
investment in wind power taking tax considerations into account.  Section V concludes. 
 Before turning to these issues it may be useful to provide a bit of an overview on 
U.S. energy production and our energy capital infrastructure.  Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of domestic energy production by fuel source for 2007.  Domestic production 
of energy totaled 71.5 quadrillion BTUs (or quads) in that year.  Roughly one-third of the 
energy we produce is coal – the United States is second only to China in world coal 
production.  Natural gas accounts for just over one-quarter and crude oil (including 
natural gas plant liquids) just under one-fifth.  Solar, geothermal and wind account for 
just one percent of U.S. energy production.2 
Figure 1. 
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2 Energy consumption totaled 101.5 quads in 2007.  The difference between consumption and production is 
made up of energy imports.  In 2007 the United States imported (net of exports) 26.6 quads of crude and 
petroleum products and 4.0 quads of natural gas. 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2009a) 
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  Table 1 provides some numbers on the value of fixed assets related to 
energy production in 2007.  The infrastructure related to energy production amounted to 
nearly $2.9 trillion.  This amounts to twelve percent of the value of the net stock of non-
residential fixed assets in that year.3  The bulk of energy related assets are structures – 
electrical generation facilities and mining exploration, shafts and wells.   
Table 1.  Net Stock of Energy-Related  
Fixed Assets in 2007 ($billions) 
Private Fixed Assets 
 Equipment and software       523.9  
  Engines and turbines 83.5  
  
Electrical transmission, distribution, 
and industrial apparatus 358.4  
  Mining and oilfield machinery 49.5  
  
Electrical equipment, not elsewhere 
classified 32.5  
 Structures    2,120.4  
  Power 1,230.6  
  
Mining exploration, shafts, and 
wells 889.8  
Government Fixed Assets       241.5  
  Power 241.5  
TOTAL    2,885.8  
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income Accounts, Fixed Asset Tables 
(www.bea.gov, accessed June 1, 2009) 
 
                                                 
3 This estimate does not include energy capital in the U.S. military nor does it include the value of 
transportation assets or computers and other equipment used in the production and distribution of energy.  
Adding transportation related equipment and structures alone would add an additional $1.3 trillion to the 
value of energy-related fixed assets. 
 4
II. Review of key energy tax code provisions 
 Energy is subject to taxes and at the same time the beneficiary of various tax 
deductions and credits at both the federal and state level.  In this section, I review the 
current treatment of energy in the tax code.4   
A. Federal Tax Provisions 
 
 To begin, income earned in the production or distribution of energy is subject to 
the U.S. income tax.  Most energy-related income is taxed through the corporate income 
tax with a top federal marginal tax rate of 35 percent.  Table 2 indicates the share of 
assets taxed through the corporate income tax in various energy-related industries.5  For 
the mining, utilities, and petroleum and coal manufacturing sectors, the vast bulk of 
assets are subject to corporate income tax. 
 
Table 2.  Share of Assets Subject to Corporate 
Income Tax 
Industry 
Corporate 
Income Tax 
Treatment 
Mining 92.3% 
Utilities 99.6% 
Petroleum and Coal Products, 
Manufacturing 
99.2% 
Retail Gasoline Sales 47.6% 
Pipeline Transportation 68.5% 
Source: Congressional Budget Office (2006), Table 3. 
 
 I analyze energy investments in this paper assuming firms are subject to federal 
and state corporate income taxes.  Many energy firms are subject to the corporate 
alternative minimum tax (AMT).  While I do not analyze the corporate AMT in detail in 
                                                 
4  This section and the next draw on Metcalf (2009b). 
5 Firms not subject to corporate tax treatment include S-corporations, individuals participating in 
partnerships and sole proprietorships. 
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this paper I do note in various places where my analytic results can be affected by the 
AMT.6 
1. Depreciation 
 
 Under the current tax code, capital assets are depreciated according to the 
Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS) with recovery periods ranging 
from 3 to 39 years.  Most capital is depreciated using a declining balance method at either 
200 percent (3, 5, 7, and 10 year property) or 150 percent (15 and 20 year property) with 
the option to shift to straight-line depreciation at whichever point it becomes 
advantageous to do so.  Assuming firms switch to straight-line depreciation at the point 
where straight-line provides a larger deduction than declining balance, the two key 
parameters are the recovery period of the asset and the declining balance deduction rate.  
Tax depreciation effectively reduces the purchase price of an asset.  If z is the present 
discounted value of the stream of depreciation deductions per dollar for an asset and τ  
the corporate tax rate, then tax depreciation reduces the price of the asset from one to 
z⋅−τ1 .   
 Electric generating capital is depreciated over different tax lives depending on the 
type of plant.  Recovery periods range from five years for renewable energy to twenty 
years for coal.  High voltage electricity transmission lines received a 15 year recovery 
period in the Energy Policy Act of 2005.  That act also clarified the depreciation of 
natural gas gathering (7 years) and reduced the recovery period of distribution pipelines 
from 20 to 15 years.  In addition, the law contained a provision allowing partial 
                                                 
6   Carlson and Metcalf (2008) provide results on the AMT's impact on the use of tax credits in the 
corporate income tax. 
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expensing for new refinery capacity placed in service before 2012.  The provision allows 
for 50 percent expensing with the remainder deducted as under current law.   
 Oil and gas drilling receives an additional depreciation benefit from the ability to 
expense dry holes.  One can view dry holes as part of the cost of drilling a successful 
well.  This tax provision raises the effective value of the depreciation deductions for oil 
rigs.  Technology, however, has reduced the percentage of dry holes.  In 1960, forty 
percent of all wells drilled were dry holes.  By 2008, that percentage had fallen to ten 
percent reducing the tax advantage of dry hole expensing.7 
2. Depreciation and Fossil Fuel Production 
 
 Depreciation of assets in the production of fossil fuels (oil and gas drilling and 
coal mining) deserve additional attention.  Chief among the depreciation preferences are 
percentage depletion and the ability to expense intangible drilling costs.  As noted in 
Metcalf (2007) these preferences are less generous than they have been historically but 
they continue to be significant.  A bit of background will help in understanding these tax 
benefits. 
 Capital investments to develop oil and gas production sites fall into one of three 
categories for federal tax purposes.  Costs incurred in finding and acquiring the rights to 
oil or gas are treated as depletable property and are written off over the life of the oil or 
gas site.  These include exploration costs to identify promising sites as well as the cost of 
up-front (or bonus) bids to acquire sites.  Once a site is identified and purchased, its oil or 
                                                 
7 Exploratory wells continue to have high failure rates.  In 2008, 32 percent of exploratory wells were dry 
holes and 8 percent of development wells were dry holes.  But only 5,600 exploratory wells were drilled 
that year compared to over 50,100 development wells.    Roughly 34,000 development wells were drilled in 
1960 with a dry hole rate of 25 percent.  However, 11,700 exploratory wells were drilled with over 80 
percent of them being dry holes.  Data are taken from the Energy Information Administration's website 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_crd_wellend_s1_a.htm accessed on July 16, 2009. 
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gas enters a firm's proven reserves.  As natural resources are extracted from booked 
reserves, the value of those reserves is diminished.  Cost depletion allows a firm to write 
off depletable costs as the reserve is drawn down.  As an example imagine a field that 
contains two million barrels of proven reserves of oil with exploration and purchase costs 
of $10 million.  Under cost depletion, the firm is allowed to write off the $10 million cost 
as oil is drilled.  Thus if the firm pumps 100,000 barrels of oil from the field in the first 
year, it would be allowed cost depletion of $500,000 since the amount pumped equals 5 
percent of the proven reserves.8 
 As an alternative to cost depletion, independent oil, gas, and coal producers are 
allowed to take percentage depletion.9  Rather than take a depletion deduction based on 
actual costs, the firm is allowed to take a certain percentage of revenue as a deduction. 
The current rate for percentage depletion is 15 percent for oil and gas and 10 percent for 
coal.  Percentage depletion is allowed on production up to 1,000 barrels of average daily 
production of oil (or its equivalent for natural gas) for the company.  In addition, the 
depletion allowance cannot exceed 100 percent of taxable income from the property (50 
percent for coal) and 65 percent of taxable income from all sources.10  Continuing with 
the example above, assume an independent firm owns this oil reserve and sells the 
100,000 barrels of oil pumped in the first year for $60 per barrel.  Assuming no taxable 
income limitations, the firm could take a deduction for 15 percent of the revenue from the 
sale of the oil or $900,000.  If the firm were to sell the entire reserve of oil at $60 per 
                                                 
8 Geological and geophysical costs may be amortized over two years (seven years for the majors). 
9 Independent producers are defined as producers who do not engage in refining or retail operations.  
EPACT increased the amount of oil a company could refine before it was deemed to engage in refining for 
this purpose from 50,000 to 75,000 barrels per day. 
10 Amounts in excess of the 65 percent rule can be carried forward to subsequent tax years.    
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barrel its cumulative depletion allowance would be $18 million, eighty percent greater 
than the depletable costs of the field. 
 Significant limits on percentage depletion have been added over time including a 
reduction in its rate and limitation to independent producers.  Despite the curtailed 
availability of percentage depletion, it continues to be a significant energy tax 
expenditure, costing $4.4 billion between 2009 and 2013 according to the 2009 
Administration budget submission (Office of Management and Budget (2009)).  Based on 
production data reported in U.S. Energy Information Administration (2009b), roughly 
one-half of domestic crude oil production in 2007 came from independent producers 
(Table A6) potentially eligible to take percentage depletion. 
 Once a property has been identified, the firm incurs significant costs to develop 
the site.  These costs, which might include site improvement, construction costs, wages, 
drilling mud, fuel, and other expenses, are called intangible drilling costs (or IDCs).  
Intangible drilling costs are all costs for which no salvage value is possible.  Typically 
non-capital costs associated with developing a capital asset are depreciated over the life 
of the asset under the uniform capitalization rules.  In the energy sector intangible drilling 
costs may be expensed by independent producers.  Integrated producers may expense 70 
percent of IDCs and write the remainder off over a five year period.11 
 The last capital expense category is the drilling equipment itself.  This is written 
off over a seven year period using double declining balance depreciation rules.  Drilling 
equipment constituted roughly ten percent of total capital costs for new projects in 2007 
according to U.S. Energy Information Administration (2008b) (table T7).  Depletable 
                                                 
11   Intangible drilling costs are not counted as a preference under the Alternative Minimum Tax. 
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costs constituted roughly one-quarter of total costs and IDCs accounted for roughly two-
thirds of costs. 
3. Production and Investment Tax Credits 
 
 The federal tax code includes a number of production and investment tax credits 
on fossil, alternative, nuclear, and renewable fuels.  These are included as part of the 
general business credit (GBC) and subject to AMT limitations.  Carlson and Metcalf 
(2008) provide evidence that energy firms are restricted in their ability to use all of their 
general business credits.  While the AMT plays a role, regular tax limitations play a more 
significant role in limiting the use of GBCs.  The important energy-related production 
and investment credits include the following: 
a. Production Tax Credits for Electricity Provided from Renewable Sources 
 Production tax credits are provided at a rate of 1.5¢ per kWh (indexed in 1992 
dollars) of electricity generated from wind, biomass, poultry waste, solar, geothermal and 
other renewable sources.12  Currently the rate is 2.1¢ per kWh.  Firms may take the credit 
for ten years.  Refined coal is also eligible for a section 45 production credit at the current 
rate of $5.877 per ton.13  The Energy Policy Act of 2005 added new hydropower and 
Indian coal with the latter receiving a credit of $1.50 per ton for the first four years and 
$2.00 per ton for three additional years (in real dollars).   
 Production tax credits have historically been authorized by Congress for a two 
year period.  Considerable uncertainty has arisen a number of times whether Congress 
would reauthorize the credit or not.  The credit lapsed three times (2000, 2002, and 2004) 
though subsequently reauthorized retroactively.  Distinct declines in wind investment 
                                                 
12   Open-loop biomass is eligible for a 0.75¢ in 1992 dollars per kWh. 
13   Refined coal is a synthetic fuel produced from coal with lower emissions of certain pollutants. 
 10
occurred in each of those periods of uncertainty as documented in Wiser and Bolinger 
(2008).  The current credit for wind was renewed in the American Reinvestment and 
Recovery Act of 2009 and is currently available for projects completed before the end of 
2012.   
 Concern arose in 2008 that the financial crisis was drying up considerable sources 
of financing for wind projects.  Anecdotal evidence suggests this is a real problem.  
According to Martin, Hansen, Marciano and Katz (2009) the number of large financial 
institutions providing equity to the renewable industry in return for access to tax shields 
has declined from eighteen in the past two years to four or five presently.  As a response 
ARRA allowed wind projects to substitute a 30 percent investment tax credit for the 
production tax credit or a cash grant for up to 30 percent of the cost of the project.14 
b. Other Production Tax Credits  
 The 2005 energy act provided a production tax credit for electricity produced at 
nuclear power plants (section 45J).  Qualifying plants are eligible for a 1.8¢ per kWh 
production tax credit for eight years up to an annual limit of $125 million per 1,000 
megawatts of installed capacity.  This limit will be binding for a nuclear power plant with 
a capacity factor of 80 percent or higher.  The law places an aggregate limit of 6,000 
megawatts of capacity eligible for this credit. 
 The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (PL 108-357) created a production 
credit (section 45I) for marginal oil and gas producers of $3.00 per barrel of oil ($.50 per 
mcf of natural gas) in year 2005 dollars.  The full credit is available when oil (gas) prices 
fall below $15 per barrel ($1.67 per mcf) and phases out when prices reach $18 per barrel 
                                                 
14 Bolinger, Wiser, Cory and James (2009) assess the relative advantages of the various options. 
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($2.00 per mcf).15  Marginal wells produce on average 15 or less barrels of oil (or oil 
equivalent) per day. 
 This same law provided for small refinery expensing of 75 percent of capital costs 
associated with low sulfur diesel fuel production and a 5¢ per gallon small refiner's credit 
for the remaining 25 percent of qualified capital costs for the production of low sulfur 
diesel fuel.  The 2005 Energy Policy Act allowed a pass through of this credit to owners 
of cooperatives. 
 Coke and coke gas producers are eligible for a $3 per barrel equivalent tax credit 
under section 45K of the tax code.  This is the last vestige of the previous section 29 non-
conventional oil production tax credit and is scheduled to expire at the end of 2009. 
d. Investment Tax Credits 
 A 30 percent investment tax credit is available for solar installations as well as 
fuel cells used to produce electricity.  A 10 percent credit is available for qualifying 
microturbine power plants.  In addition to credits for renewable energy, the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 enacted credits for investments in certain clean coal facilities. 
Integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) plants are eligible for a 20 percent credit 
(up to a maximum of $800 million in credits); other advanced coal-based projects are 
eligible for a 15 percent credit (up to a maximum of $500 million in credits); and certified 
gasification projects are also eligible for a 20 percent credit (maximum of $350 million in 
credits).    
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 contained a provision for a 15 
percent credit (section 43) for expenditures on enhanced oil recovery tangible property 
and intangible drilling and development costs and other related capital expenditures.  The 
                                                 
15 The section 29 reference price is used to determine eligibility for this credit. 
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credit is phased out as the section 29 reference oil price exceeds $28 in 1990 dollars 
($37.44 for 2005).  At current prices, producers cannot take this credit. 
e. Section 40 Alcohol and Biodiesel Fuels Credit 
 The Energy Policy Act of 1978 included an exemption from the motor fuels 
excise tax for alcohol and alcohol blended fuels, generically known as gasohol.16   The 
Windfall Profits Tax allowed an immediate tax credit in lieu of the exemption.17  The 
credit was set at a rate to be equivalent to the tax exemption.  The alcohol fuel mixture 
credit is currently $.45 per gallon of ethanol in gasohol and $.60 for other alcohol based 
fuels (excluding petroleum based alcohol fuels).  In addition small producers may take a 
credit of $.10 per gallon.  The 2005 Energy Policy Act increased the small producer 
production capacity limit from 30 million to 60 million gallons per year.   
 The American Jobs Creation Act also added section 40A to the code to provide an 
income tax credit for biodiesel fuels at a rate of $.50 per gallon of bio-diesel (other than 
agri-biodiesel) and $1.00 for agri-biodiesel.  Like the alcohol fuel tax credit, it is first 
applied to motor fuel excise tax payments with the excess added to the general business 
credit.  
B. State Tax Provisions 
 
 Most states levy a corporate income tax with top rates that varied from two to 
twelve percent in 2006.  In addition thirty-five states impose severance taxes on mineral 
extraction in their states.  Table 3 lists the top fifteen states in severance tax collections 
ranked by amount of collections in fiscal year 2008.  Alaska, Texas, and Oklahoma lead 
                                                 
16 Originally, the law provided a full exemption from the then $.04 per gallon tax.  As the motor fuels 
excise tax was raised over time, the exemption did not keep pace with the excise tax rate.  See General 
Accounting Office (1997) for an early chronology of events related to this tax exemption.  
17 The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 subsequently eliminated the tax exemption in favor of the tax 
credit. 
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the list and account for two-thirds of total U.S. severance tax collections in that year.  
These three states were among the top five oil producing states in 2008 (the other two 
states are Louisiana and California).  Wyoming is a significant oil and gas producing 
state as well as the largest coal producing state in the country.  While I do not have 
detailed data breaking out severance tax collections by fuel, it appears that oil and gas are 
responsible for the lion's share of revenue. 
 The fifteen states in Table 3 account for over 95 percent of severance tax 
collections in 2008.  For many of these states severance taxes account for a large fraction 
of total state tax revenues.   
Table 3.  State Severance Tax Collections in 2008 
State 
   
Severance 
Tax 
Share of 
Aggregate 
Severance 
Taxes 
Share 
of 
State 
Taxes 
Alaska 6,939,040 38.0% 82.4% 
Texas 4,131,185 22.6% 9.2% 
Oklahoma 1,184,765 6.5% 14.0% 
New Mexico 1,089,836 6.0% 19.2% 
Louisiana 1,035,695 5.7% 9.4% 
Wyoming 883,786 4.8% 40.8% 
North Dakota 791,692 4.3% 34.2% 
West Virginia 347,592 1.9% 7.1% 
Montana 347,221 1.9% 14.1% 
Kentucky 293,334 1.6% 2.9% 
Alabama  197,581 1.1% 2.2% 
Kansas 168,696 0.9% 2.4% 
Colorado 151,474 0.8% 1.6% 
Mississippi 135,248 0.7% 2.0% 
Michigan 113,506 0.6% 0.5% 
United States 18,259,637 2.3% 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2009) accessed on July 17, 2009.  
Amounts in thousands of dollars. 
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 In my analysis below of the impact of taxes on energy investment I take the state 
corporate tax into account.  I use an average tax rate of 6.6 percent which when combined 
with the federal corporate tax rate of 35 percent gives a total corporate tax rate of 39.3 
percent.18  I assume that severance taxes reduce the price paid to owners of land on which 
the taxed energy sources are found.  This follows from the inelasticity of supply of 
reserves and the ease of substitutability among consumers across different state supplies 
of coal, oil, or natural gas.   
III. Effective Tax Rates on Energy Capital Investments 
 As the previous section makes clear the treatment of energy in the tax code is 
complex.  In this section I construct a summary measure of the tax code's provisions.  
The tax literature contains a number of summary measures of the tax code and two 
measures are particularly relevant for thinking about capital investment: the Hall 
Jorgenson (1967) user cost of capital and marginal effective tax rates (see King and 
Fullerton (1984) for a treatment of this latter measure).  The first statistic measures the 
required marginal product of capital that a firm must receive in order to pay its marginal 
taxes and provide a required return to investors.  Assuming declining marginal product of 
capital, a higher user cost of capital is associated with lower demand for capital by a firm.  
The latter measure is a transformation of the user cost measure that provides the same 
information in the form of a tax rate.  While either measure can be useful for empirical 
work, the latter is more easily interpreted and so I report marginal effective tax rate 
measures in this section. 
                                                 
18  The state corporate tax rate is deductible from federal corporate income taxes.  Thus the aggregate rate  
equals 35% + (1-35%)(6.6%) or 39.3%.  The state average tax rate is taken from the Ernst and Young 
corporate state tax dataset as reported in Ernst & Young (2007). 
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 Specifically I construct effective tax rates on capital investments in energy 
infrastructure.  An effective tax rate measures the difference in the before and after-tax 
return on a marginal investment relative to its before-tax return.  More precisely, the 
before-tax return is the return an investment must earn in order to cover its cost, pay the 
required return to investors and to pay taxes on the project.  The after-tax return is the 
return that savers expect to receive after taxes on marginal investments.   
 Following the terminology in Congressional Budget Office (2005), let  ρ   be the 
real before-tax return on the marginal investment for a particular capital asset category 
and  r  the real return paid to investors.  The effective tax rate is defined as 
 
(1) ρ
ρ r− . 
Thus, if savers are prepared to accept seven percent on an investment after tax  (r)  and 
the project must earn ten percent in order to cover depreciation, taxes, and required 
payments to investors ( ρ ), the effective tax rate is 30 percent ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −
10
710 .   
 Effective tax rates focus on the marginal cost of funding investments rather than 
on project cost.  In particular, it focuses on the cost of a break-even investment.  Because 
they summarize the many provisions of the tax code that affect the returns to capital 
investment, effective tax rates are frequently used to consider how the tax system affects 
capital investment.  This is a particularly salient issue given the capital investment needs 
of energy infrastructure in the United States as noted in the introduction.   
 I follow the methodology of Congressional Budget Office ( (2005, 2006)) to 
construct effective tax rates for energy capital.  My measures differ from those reported 
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in the CBO reports in two ways.  First, I analyze assets at a more disaggregated level than 
is done in those reports.  Second, I take into account more provisions of the tax code than 
do those reports.  In particular the CBO studies do not account for energy-specific 
production or investment tax credits or for tax rules specific to the oil and gas industry.  I 
begin with a brief overview of the construction of effective tax rates.  Readers seeking a 
fuller description should read Congressional Budget Office (2006) or any of the 
references cited therein.  I then discuss how I modify the standard ETR measure for 
energy-specific tax provisions. 
 Ignoring energy specific deductions and credits, the required before-tax return is 
equal to  
 
(2) ( ) δτ
τδρ −−
−+=
4434421
ucc
zr
1
)1(~ . 
 
Equation (2) says that the real before-tax return equals the user cost of capital (ucc) less 
the economic rate of depreciation.  The parameter r~  in equation (2) is the real corporate 
discount rate measured as ( ) Edid )1()1( −+−− πτ .  The discount rate is a weighted 
average of the real after-tax cost of borrowing where i  is the corporate borrowing rate, π  
is the expected inflation rate,  τ   is the corporate tax rate,  d  is the share of investment 
financed by debt, and E  is the real return on equity.  Assets are assumed to depreciate at 
an exponential rate with the rate of decay equal to δ .  The present value of tax 
depreciation is given by z and depends on tax rules specific to each asset.   
 Equation (2) makes clear that either the user cost of capital or the effective tax 
rate measure is a summary statistic for the tax code's various provisions and their impact 
on marginal investments.  In the next section I report regressions using the user cost of 
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capital measure as it is less sensitive to small changes in the firm's discount rate.  In this 
section I focus on the effective tax rate measure as it is a more easily interpretable 
measure.   
 In some cases, I compute effective tax rates for investments that are composed of 
different types of capital each of which faces its own effective tax rate.  In those cases I 
construct before-tax returns for each capital component and compute the weighted 
before-tax return for the investment weighting by the share of the component in the total 
investment cost.   
 A key element in the taxation of capital assets is the tax treatment of depreciation.  
Let z equal the present discounted value of the stream of depreciation deductions 
assuming particular tax rules for an asset.  If Dt is the amount of depreciation allowed in 
year t for an asset with initial basis of 1 and a recovery period of T years, then z equals 
 
(3) ( )∑= −+=
T
t
t
t
r
D
z
1
1~1
. 
 
The present discounted value of depreciation deductions is equal to the tax rate times z 
(assuming the tax rate does not change over the life of the asset).  Thus, the effective 
after-tax purchase price of an asset is equal to z⋅−τ1  times the cost of the asset.  Below, 
I will show how the effective price is affected by energy-specific tax rules. 
 Table 4 reports tax depreciation rules and estimates of economic depreciation for 
various energy related assets.  Capital shares are reported in parentheses after each asset 
type.  Capital shares for nuclear power plants are taken from Table 4.2.2 of Tennessee 
Valley Authority (2005).  This report provides cost estimates for an advanced boiling 
water reactor that would be designed and constructed under the new combined 
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construction permit and operating license (COL) rules implemented in the Energy Policy 
Act of 1992.  Oil drilling costs vary depending on the particular characteristics of 
different sites.  I have chosen a representative set of cost shares to construct a composite 
effective tax rate for drilling.  The breakdown of intangible drilling costs for integrated 
firms reflects tax rules allowing expensing for 70 percent of IDC costs with the remainder 
to be deducted over five years. 
 
Table 4.  Energy Capital Depreciation 
 Recovery period Method 
Economic 
Depreciation 
Rate 
Electric Utilities    
 Generation    
  Nuclear    
     Steam Turbines (25%) 15 150% 5.16%
     Other Equipment (54%) 15 150% 5.00%
     Structures (21%) 15 150% 2.11%
  Coal (PC) 20 150% 5.16%
  Coal (IGCC) 20 150% 5.16%
  Gas 15 150% 5.16%
  Wind 5 200% 3.03%
  Solar Thermal 5 200% 3.03%
 Transmission and Distribution    
  Transmission Lines 15 150% 5.00%
  Distribution Lines 20 150% 5.00%
Petroleum    
 Oil Drilling (non-integrated firms)    
  Oil Drilling (tangible) (10%) 7 200% 7.51%
  IDC (70%) expensed 10.00%
  Depletable Assets (20%) percentage depletion 7.51%
 Oil Drilling (integrated firms)    
  Oil Drilling (tangible) (10%) 7 200% 7.51%
  IDC (70%)    
    Expensible IDC (49%) expensed 7.51%
    Deductible IDC (21%) 5 200% 7.51%
  Depletable Assets (20%) cost depletion 7.51%
 Refining 10 200% 8.91%
Natural Gas    
 19
 Gathering Pipelines 7 200% 2.37%
 Other Pipelines 15 150% 2.37%
Economic depreciation rates taken from Bureau of Economic Analysis (2008) available at 
http://www.bea.gov/national/FA2004/Tablecandtext.pdf.  The economic depreciation rate in the 
case of percentage depletion is set equal to the depletion rate for a representative well.  See text for 
more information. 
 
 The formula for the before-tax return in equation 2 needs to be modified to 
account for production and investment tax credits as well as for percentage depletion for 
oil and gas drilling.  Investment tax credits at rate κ  are a straightforward modification.  
Production tax credits and percentage depletion are slightly more complicated.  Let θ  be 
the capacity factor for a renewable electricity investment.  This would equal roughly 30 
percent for wind, for example.  A 1 kW facility produces 8760θ  kWhs of electricity over 
the year where 8760 is the number of hours in a year.  If p is the overnight cost of 1 kW 
of capacity, a ten year production tax credit is worth (per dollar of investment) 
(4) ( ) ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−=+= ∑= 10
10
1
~1~
1
~
18760
~1
8760
rrrp
s
pr
s
t
t
θθν  
 
where s is the subsidy rate (dollars per kWh).19   
 Accounting for production and investment tax credits as well as percentage 
depletion, the required before-tax rate of return becomes 
(5) ( ) δμψττ
τνκδρ −+−
−−−+=
1
)1(~ zr  
 
where ψ   is the percentage depletion rate and  μ   the ratio of price to operating profit.  
The percentage depletion rate for oil is 15 percent.20  If percentage depletion is taken, the 
firm would have no depletion as part of z.  The ratio of price to operating profit will vary 
                                                 
19 Since the effective tax rate methodology generally uses continuous time analogues, an alternative 
formula is ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=
−
r
e
p
s r
~
18760
~10θν . 
20  I ignore any net income limitations in this calculation.  My treatment of percentage depletion follows 
that of the Congressional Budget Office (1985) study on oil and gas.   
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depending on the particular source of oil.  While the price of a barrel of oil is 
straightforward to measure, the appropriate measure of operating profit per barrel of oil is 
not.  One approach to measuring operating profit might be to take the oil price and 
subtract production costs (finding and lifting costs).   The domestic first purchase price 
for oil was roughly $60 in 2006.  According to U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(2007), production costs were roughly $25 per barrel.  This suggests a mark-up of 1.71.   
 Adelman (1995) cautions that the standard measure of finding costs (the sum of 
exploration and development expenditures divided by oil and gas reserves added (in oil 
equivalents)) is a flawed measure.  As Adelman notes, exploration adds knowledge while 
development adds reserves.  The knowledge from exploration may add to reserves at 
present but may not add to reserves for many years.  In addition, the conversion of gas 
into oil equivalents is not stable over time as it depends on how oil and gas are used as 
well as their relative prices.  The EIA study acknowledges the first problem and 
addresses this by averaging finding costs over three years.   
 Alternatively one could simply measure operating profit from firm balance sheets.  
U.S. Energy Information Administration (2007), Table 9,  reports income and expenses 
for major energy producers.  The ratio of revenue to operating income in 2006 was 1.86.  
Based on these two estimates of  the mark-up ratio (μ ), I use a ratio of 1.75 in my 
calculations below.  Table 5 reports the parameters I use in my effective tax rate 
calculations that are not technology specific. 
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Table 5.  Effective Tax Rate Parameters 
Parameter Value 
Real Required Return to Equity (E) 7%
Inflation Rate (π ) 3%
Nominal Bond Rate (i) 8.6%
Federal Tax Rate ( Fτ ) 35%
Average State Tax Rate ( Sτ ) 6.6%
Combined Tax Rate (τ ) 39.3%
Source: Real required equity return from Table 17 in 
Congressional Budget Office (2006).  Nominal bond 
rate is the fifty year average of BAA bonds taken from 
Table B-73 in Council of Economic Advisors (2008). 
 
 Table 6 below reports my estimates of effective tax rates on new energy-related 
capital investments based on the formulas described above.  I provide estimates for 
different forms of electric generation capital, other electricity related capital, capital used 
in the drilling and refining of oil as well as in the transport of natural gas.   
 The first part of Table 6 provides estimates of effective tax rates for electric 
generation capital.  Under current law (column 1), solar thermal and wind capital is 
subsidized to the greatest extent with effective marginal subsidy rates of 245 and 164 
percent respectively.  Nuclear power is also heavily subsidized with a subsidy rate of 
nearly 100 percent.  The effective tax rates for coal and gas are substantially higher than 
for nuclear or renewables.  IGCC capital is subsidized while pulverized coal capital faces 
a positive tax.  The major difference here is the 20 percent investment tax credit for new 
IGCC investments.  Finally, coal (PC) and natural gas combined cycle face an effective 
tax rate very close to the statutory tax rate (39.3 percent accounting for state and federal 
taxes).  
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Table 6. Effective Tax Rates 
 
Current 
Law 
No Tax 
Credits 
Economic 
Depreciation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
I. Electric Utilities    
 Generation  
  Nuclear -99.5% 32.4% -49.4% 
  Coal (PC) 38.9% 38.9% 39.3% 
  Coal (IGCC) -11.6% 38.9% -10.3% 
  Gas 34.4% 34.4% 39.3% 
  Wind -163.8% 12.8% -13.7% 
  Solar Thermal -244.7% 12.8% -26.5% 
 Transmission and Distribution    
  Transmission Lines 34.0% 34.0% 39.3% 
  Distribution Lines 38.5% 38.5% 39.3% 
2. Petroleum    
 Oil Drilling (non-integrated firms) -13.5% -13.5% 39.3% 
 Oil Drilling (integrated firms) 15.2% 15.2% 39.3% 
 Refining 19.1% 19.1% 39.3% 
3. Natural Gas    
 Gathering Pipelines 15.4% 15.4% 39.3% 
 Other Pipelines 27.0% 27.0% 39.3% 
Source: Author's calculations. 
 
 The next two columns in Table 6 indicate the impact on effective tax rates of 
removing the production and investment tax credits (column 2) and replacing accelerated 
depreciation with economic depreciation.21   The production or investment tax credits are 
the most significant source of subsidy – as evidenced by the change in the effective tax 
rate when the credits are removed.  The effective tax rate for wind, for example, rises 
from -164 percent to -14 percent if economic depreciation replaces accelerated 
depreciation while it rises to +13 percent if the production tax credit is eliminated.  With 
economic depreciation and no production or investment tax credits, the effective tax rate 
in all cases equals the statutory tax rate of 39.3 percent. 
                                                 
21   Here the effective tax rate formula uses the exponential economic depreciation rate for tax depreciation 
rather than approximating it with straight-line depreciation. 
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 The effective tax rate methodology can be used for other types of energy capital.  
In the electric utility section, I also construct effective tax rates for transmission and 
distribution.  Transmission lives are allowed a fifteen year recovery period while 
distribution lines are allowed a twenty year recovery period.  The former face an effective 
tax rate modestly lower than the statutory rate while the latter receive very little in the 
form of a subsidy. 
 Effective tax rates in the petroleum sector depend in large part on whether the 
firms taking the credits are integrated or non-integrated (independent) firms.  Independent 
firms benefit from full expensing of their intangible drilling costs while the integrated 
firms can only expense 70 percent of their IDCs and must write the rest off over a five 
year period.  In addition, the independents are allowed to take percentage depletion while 
the integrated firms must use cost depletion.     
 The effective tax rate on oil drilling equipment depends importantly on the ability 
to take percentage rather than cost depletion.  For independent firms taking percentage 
depletion, the effective tax rate is -13 percent whereas firms taking cost depletion face 
effective tax rates of 15 percent.  The rate for integrated firms is a bit lower than the 
effective tax rate on refining capital.  The effective tax rate for refining capital assumes 
the temporary 50 percent expensing provision for capacity additions.  This reflects the 
fact that most new investment in refineries has been in increasing the capacity of existing 
refineries rather than in building new refineries.22  In the absence of the temporary 
expensing provision, the effective tax rate on refinery capital would rise from 19 to 32 
percent.  The lower tax rate on gathering pipelines relative to other pipelines reflects the 
                                                 
22   The number of operable refineries has been steadily declining from its recent peak of 324 in 1981 to 
150 in 2008.  Gross inputs to refineries, on the other hand, has increased by nearly twenty percent over this 
same period.  See Table 5.9 in U.S. Energy Information Administration (2009a).   
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seven year recovery period for this capital versus the fifteen year recovery period for 
other pipelines. 
 The effective tax rate for independent firms taking percentage depletion is 
sensitive to the ratio of price to operating profit per barrel.  Figure 2 shows how the 
effective tax rate changes as this ratio changes.  Percentage depletion drives the effective 
tax rate down as the oil price relative to per barrel operating profits falls.  The rising cost 
of extracting oil in the United States means that the effective tax rate for independent 
firms able to take percentage depletion is falling holding other factors constant. 
 This section has provided current estimates of effective tax rates for energy 
capital investment taking into account energy-specific provisions of the tax code.  What 
effect do these provisions have on energy investment?  In the next section I make a 
preliminary estimate of the impact by considering the relationship between taxation and 
investment in wind power.   
Figure 2 
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IV. Analysis of Wind Investment 
 
 In this section I provide an initial analysis of the impact of tax policy on wind 
investment.  I focus on wind because it is the most rapidly growing source of renewable 
electricity investment in the United States and the perceived importance of the production 
tax credit in driving that growth.  I carry out an econometric analysis of wind investment 
to measure the impact of the tax code on that investment. 
 Little empirical work has been carried out to measure the impact of government 
policy on wind power investment.  Kahn and Goldman (1987) measure changes in the 
rate of return of renewable projects arising from changes in tax law but do not actually 
estimate tax impacts on investment.   Building on the work of Hassett and Metcalf 
(1999), Grobman and Carey (2003) construct a Markov model to simulate intermittency 
of government tax policy and find that investment is shifted across periods to take 
advantage of high-incentive periods in the tax code.  The results of their simulations are 
consistent with the pattern of wind investment observed in the United States (see Figure 3 
below).  Mulder (2008) considers a cross-country panel data of wind investment in the 
EU and estimates a number of investment models and finds limited empirical support for 
the role of policy instruments in driving wind investment.  The coefficients on his policy 
variables are all imprecisely estimated, especially when he allows for country fixed 
effects.  He concludes, on the basis of cross-country differences in wind growth rates that 
feed-in tariffs were important drivers of investment in Germany, Denmark and Spain.23  
Mulder's is the only study I am aware of that empirically estimates investment as a 
function of tax variables.   
                                                 
23   Feed-in tariffs are mandated minimum prices utilities must pay for electricity generated by specified 
renewable sources.  These are typically combined with requirements that a certain amount of electricity be 
generated from renewable sources.    
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 Table 7 shows the capacity in various renewable sources of electricity along with 
growth rates between 1990 and 2007 as well as 2003 to 2007. 
Table 7.   U.S. Electric Net Summer Capacity 
 Capacity Annual Growth Rate 
Share of Total 
Capacity in 2007 
 2007 
1990 - 
2007 
2003 - 
2007  
Source MW   
Renewable Total 107,953 1.3% 2.8% 10.9% 
   Biomass 10,313 1.5% 1.7% 1.0% 
     Waste 4,134 3.0% 2.4% 0.4% 
     Wood and Derived Fuels 6,704 1.1% 3.4% 0.7% 
   Geothermal 2,214 -1.1% 0.9% 0.2% 
   Hydroelectric Conventional 77,884 0.3% -0.3% 7.8% 
   Solar/PV 500 2.8% 5.9% 0.1% 
   Wind 16,515 13.9% 28.8% 1.7% 
Nonrenewable Total 886,934 1.9% 1.0% 89.1% 
Total 994,887 1.8% 1.2%  
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2009a), Table 8.11a.  Capacity is measured in megawatts 
(MW). 
 
 Renewable sources of electricity account for nearly 11 percent of U.S. capacity.  
Of this, nearly 8 percent is conventional hydroelectric power.  Wind is the next most 
significant renewable source accounting for 1.7 percent of total capacity in 2007.  Solar 
generated electricity accounts for 0.1 percent of total capacity.  The relative growth rates 
of renewable and nonrenewable energy have shifted over time.  While nonrenewable 
capacity grew at a more rapid rate than renewable capacity between 1990 and 2007, the 
opposite is true if we focus on more recent investments.  Over the past four years (for 
which data are available) renewable capacity has grown at nearly three times the growth 
rate of nonrenewable capacity.   Wind is a major factor driving the rapid growth in 
renewable capacity with an annualized growth rate of nearly thirty percent over the past 
four years.   
 27
 Of the 16,515 megawatts of wind generated electricity capacity in place by 2007 
roughly 90 percent of it was installed in the past decade.24  Figure 3 shows monthly 
capacity additions from 1999 through 2007. 
Figure 3. 
Wind Capacity Additions
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 Investments in wind occurred in spurts since 1999.  Two forces are significant for 
helping explain wind investment.  First, natural gas prices began to rise in 1999.  They 
peaked in January 2001 at $8.91 per thousand cubic feet (mcf) – nearly three times the 
price from the previous January – before collapsing later that year to a low of $3.37.  
They then began to rise again hitting of $12.16 in October 2005 before retreating a bit 
and then stabilizing through 2007 at a price between $7 and $8 per mcf.25    
                                                 
24   Cumulative capacity at the end of 1997 was 1,542 megawatts. 
25  These are city gate prices reported by the U.S. Energy Information Administration in nominal dollars.  
EIA only began reporting data on prices paid by electricity generators in 2003.  The prices paid by 
electricity generators are on average $.54 per mcf lower than the city gate price and generally are lower 
month to month.  The correlation between the two price series since EIA began reporting utility prices is 
0.97. 
Source: EIA Form 860 
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 The second factor affecting wind investments is Congressional treatment of the 
federal production tax credit.  The shaded regions in the figure above show three periods 
during which the credit expired.  While it was in all cases subsequently reinstated 
retroactively, investors faced uncertainty over the credit's future.   
 Another factor driving investment in wind is the consistency and power of the 
wind at available sites.  Figure 4 graphs estimates of the annual average wind power in 
the United States at a height of 50 meters.26  Wind power is classified in one of seven 
classes.  Classes 3 through 7 are suitable for wind generated electricity with higher class 
numbers more suitable than lower.  The map shows considerable heterogeneity but in 
general coastal waters and the Midwest have the most desirable wind power 
characteristics.  Not surprisingly the states with the most installed wind capacity as of 
2007 were in these areas (Texas, California, Iowa, Washington, Minnesota, and Colorado 
all have installed capacity in that year in excess of 1000 MW). 
 I present some data and analysis of investments in wind capacity between 1990 
and 2007 using data from the Energy Information Administration Form 860 filed by all 
electricity generators.  Table 8 provides information about wind generator investments 
over the time period.  Nameplate capacity of new investments on average was just under 
50 megawatts (MW) and showed considerable variation.  The average turbine size was 
1.2 MW and the average wind generator was made up of over 40 turbines.  Average 
                                                 
26   The map was developed by the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Energy Efficiency and 
Renewable Energy and is available at http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/wind_maps.asp.  The map 
was accessed on July 13, 2009. 
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capacity was more than twice as much for projects installed in this decade compared to 
the previous decade.  This reflects the industry's move to substantially larger turbines.27 
 
Table 8.  Wind Generator Investment 
 Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
1990 - 2007     
Capacity 47.7 63.6 0.1 300.5
Turbine Size 1.2 0.5 0.1 3.0
Number of Turbines 41.7 61.5 1.0 617.0
1990 - 1999     
Capacity 20.8 27.7 0.1 112.5
Turbine Size 0.6 0.2 0.1 1.8
Number of Turbines 52.1 94.6 1.0 617.0
2000 - 2007     
Capacity 54.4 68.1 0.6 300.5
Turbine Size 1.4 0.5 0.6 3.0
Number of Turbines 39.1 50.0 1.0 274.0
Source: Author's calculations from Form 860 data.  Capacity refers to nameplate capacity.  
Capacity and turbine size is in megawatts (MW).  There are 325 generators overall for the 
continental 48 states with 65 in the first subperiod and 260 in the second. 
 
                                                 
27 The median turbine size in both subsamples is similar to the mean.  The median number of turbines 
declines from 16.0 to 15.5 reflecting the fact that fewer projects with large numbers of turbines were 
initiated in this decade. 
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Figure 4 
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 I constructed user cost of capital and effective tax rate measures for each 
generator taking into account differences in state corporate tax rates and otherwise using 
the parameter values from Table 5.  I constructed estimates of overnight cost by fitting a 
quadratic regression to the cost data reported in Wiser and Bolinger (2008).  Overnight 
costs in year 2007 dollars decline from $2,400 per kW of installed capacity in 1990 to a 
low of $1,400 per kW in 2002 before gradually rising to $1,559 in 2007.  The user cost of 
capital and effective tax rate measures depend importantly on investor perceptions of the 
credit during the three periods in which the credit lapsed.  I constructed two measures.  
The first assumes the credit is in force throughout as, ex post, occurred.  The second 
measure zeros out the credit for any project completed during the time period in which 
the credit lapsed.  This reflects investors' concerns that the credit may not be reinstated.   
 Table 9 provides summary information on the user cost of capital and the 
effective tax rates for wind projects in different states and years.   
Table 9.  Tax Statistics 
 Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
ucc1 4.15% 0.57% 3.36% 5.69% 
ucc2 4.57% 1.23% 3.36% 7.92% 
ucc3 7.77% 0.07% 7.64% 7.95% 
etr1 -362.4% 204.9% -1103.2% -65.5% 
etr2 -312.5% 227.6% -1103.2% 14.4% 
etr3 12.8% 0.8% 10.5% 14.5% 
Source: Author's calculations.  Statistics on 1065 observations for generators 
and continental states between 1990 and 2007.  ucc stands for user cost of 
capital and etr for effective tax rate.  ucc1 and etr1 treat the federal 
production tax credit as continuously in force during the time period.  ucc2 
and etr2 treat the credit as not in effect for projects initiated during period the 
credit lapsed.  ucc3 and etr3 are measures assuming no production tax credit 
at all. 
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The mean user cost of capital assuming the production tax credit is always in force (as it 
was ex post) is quite low and ranges from 3.4 to 5.7 percent.  This implies highly negative 
effective tax rates ranging from – 1100 to – 65 percent.  The effective tax rate measures 
here and below are quite sensitive to the after-tax return available to investors elsewhere 
and so in regression work below I include the user cost measure as a regressor rather than 
the effective tax rate. 
 If investors assume no production tax credit during the period when the credit 
lapses the user cost and effective tax rate measures (ucc2 and etr2) are slightly higher.  I 
also include estimates of the user cost and tax rate where I ignore the production tax 
credit.  The mean user cost rises by 3.6 percentage points and the mean effective tax rate 
becomes positive.28   
 I next present an analysis of the impact of the tax code on wind investment.  The 
basic estimating equation regresses capacity investment (Y) on the user cost of capital 
(ucc) and other controls 
(6) ijtiijtitijt XuccY εαγβ +++=  
where i indexes states, j generators, and t years.    For states with no wind investment in a 
given year I set Y to zero.  Before presenting results I must address two issues.  The first 
is that unobserved heterogeneity across states is likely to affect both the desirability of 
investing in a given state as well as some of the potential explanatory variables.  One 
factor that may drive wind investment at the state level is the presence of a state 
renewable portfolio standard (RPS).  An RPS program mandates that local electricity 
distribution companies (LDC) provide some given percentage of their electricity from 
                                                 
28  It is still well below the statutory rate because of the benefits of the five year tax write-off of wind 
capital. 
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renewable sources.  Typically this is done by the LDC submitting renewable electricity 
certificates (RECs) for the required amount of electricity.  RECs are issued to renewable 
electricity generators based on their kWh production.  The generators then sell the 
certificates to LDCs who are required to submit them to the RPS regulator.  Selling the 
RECs provides additional revenue for the generator that adds to the profitability of the 
project.   
 As of July 2009 twenty-nine states had mandatory RPS programs and an 
additional five had RPS goals (non-mandatory).  Most of these have been enacted in the 
past five years.  Figure 5 shows the dispersion across states.  Most regions have RPS 
programs in effect with the conspicuous absence of programs in the Southeast.  This is 
perhaps not surprising given the lack of wind resources in this region. 
Figure 5.  State RPS Programs 
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 In the econometric analysis I control for the presence of a state RPS program.  But 
this does not entirely address unobserved heterogeneity issue.  I address this issue by 
including fixed effects – either at the state or regional level.  This is valid under the 
assumption that the unobserved heterogeneity (call this green tastes) are constant across 
time within states (or regions).   
 The second issue is that roughly one-third of my observations on capacity (Yijt) 
are positive with the rest equaling zero.  Running an OLS regression is not appropriate 
for these data.  Under the assumption that the error term in a regression with a latent 
dependent variable (Yijt*) measuring desired investment is normal, a Tobit regression is 
appropriate.  The observed dependent variable Yijt = max(0, Yijt*).  The only drawback to 
this approach is that a simple (parametric) transformation of a Tobit model to eliminate 
the fixed effects does not exist.  One can run a Tobit explicitly controlling for the 
individual effects with dummy variables but the coefficient estimates are biased for small 
numbers of time periods.  Greene (2004) presents Monte Carlo results that suggest that 
the parameters of interest – for us the coefficients on the user cost of capital – are 
unaffected by the presence of fixed effects.  He shows that the estimated standard errors 
are affected by the presence of fixed effects.  For that reason I will present robust 
standard error estimates below.  Moreover Greene notes that the bias is negligible as the 
number of time periods rises.  Given the large number of years in the sample (T=18), any 
bias in the estimated standard errors is likely to be trivial. 
 Regression results are presented in Table 10.  Column 1 reports an OLS 
regression of investment on the user cost of capital measure, an RPS dummy, along with 
state and year fixed effects.  The user cost coefficient is negative as expected though not 
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precisely estimated.  The coefficient on the RPS dummy is positive as expected and 
precisely estimated.  Because of the large number of zero observations, however, we 
should view this regression with some caution.  The remaining regressions on investment 
capacity are Tobits.  Column (2) reports a Tobit regression with state and year fixed 
effects.  The coefficient on the user cost is now much larger in absolute value though as I 
discuss later one cannot directly compare the two estimated coefficients.  The p-value on 
the user cost coefficient is 0.003.  The RPS dummy has the expected sign but is not 
statistically significant.   
 Figure 6 graphs the year effects from this regression as well as the national 
average price for natural gas (city gate price).  Not surprisingly capacity additions track 
natural gas prices reasonably closely as would be expected if wind serves as a substitute 
for natural gas power plants.  The correlation between the year effects and the gas price is 
0.80.   
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Figure 6. 
Year Effects and Natural Gas Prices
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 Most of the variation in the RPS variable is across states and so I report a 
regression where I replace the state fixed effects with region fixed effects.  This also 
allows me to maintain more observations in the regressions since the Tobit fixed effects 
regression requires dropping all states for which no investment occurs over the sample.  I 
group states into the nine census regions.29  This approach is reasonable if the unobserved 
tastes for renewable investment are constant within regions.  The estimated coefficient on 
the user cost of capital increases in magnitude as does the coefficient on the RPS dummy.  
The latter is now statistically significant. 
                                                 
29 The states in each region are as follows: New England:  Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island; Midatlantic: New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania; South 
Atlantic: West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, District of Columbia, 
Maryland, Delaware; East South Central: Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, Alabama, Mississippi; East 
North Central: Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, Indiana, Ohio; West North Central: North Dakota, South 
Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Iowa; West South Central: Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana; 
Mountain: Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico; Pacific: California, 
Oregon, Washington, Alaska, Hawaii.  
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 Finally, I report a Tobit regression where I do not include state fixed effects.  The 
estimated coefficient on the user cost variable increases in absolute value by roughly 
sixty percent.  This suggests that failing to control for correlated and unobserved 
heterogeneity leads to an overestimate of the impact of tax policy on investment. 
 Summing up, the coefficient on the user cost variable is precisely estimated and 
robust to regression specification.  As a final check I run another set of regressions in 
which I control for the size of the state (columns (5) – (8) of Table 10).  Holding other 
factors constant, one might expect that more wind projects would be put in larger states.  
Thus I run regressions in which the dependent variable is installed capacity divided by 
the area of each state (in thousand square miles). 
 These regressions are very similar in nature to the regressions on installed 
capacity.  The coefficient on the user cost of capital continues to be precisely estimated 
while the RPS coefficient is only precisely estimated in the model with region dummies.  
Again failing to control for unobserved state-level heterogeneity biases the tax effect in 
an upward direction (in absolute value). 
 In addition to the regressions reported in Table 10, I ran various other regressions 
not reported here.  First I ran a regression in which I include state-specific city gate prices 
for natural gas and measures of wind power at sites where wind projects are sited 
(average values for states in years with no investment).30  After including year effects – 
which as we've seen are strongly correlated with investment activity – the coefficient on 
the natural gas variable has the expected sign but is imprecisely estimated.  This is 
perhaps not surprising since little variation is left in the gas price data after including 
state and year fixed effects.  The wind power coefficient is precisely estimated but has a 
                                                 
30 Ideally I would use gas prices paid by electric utilities.  EIA only begins reporting these data in 2003. 
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negative sign.  Since I include state fixed effects in the regression the wind power 
variable is picking up variation within the state in wind power.  It may simply be that 
conditional on average wind power in a state, variations around the average are simply 
not that important in siting decisions (or are correlated with other unobserved state 
specific siting variables).  Including these variables has little effect on the user cost of 
capital coefficient. 
 Second I ran regressions in which I replaced the user cost of capital variable with 
the user cost variable which ignores the production tax credit lapses.  The regressions 
exhibit a poorer statistical fit and the coefficients on the user cost have the wrong sign 
and are implausibly large. This provides support for the view that investors were not 
confident that the federal government would reinstate the production tax credit when it 
lapsed and that the reinstatement would be retroactive. 
 Third I ran regressions to control for the possibility that investors were 
temporarily shifting investment in anticipation of a credit lapsing or being reinstated.  
Specifically I dropped observations for all months just before or just after a credit lapsed 
or was reinstated.  For example, the production tax credit lapsed for the first time after 
June 30, 1999 and was reinstated as of Dec. 19, 1999.  I dropped observations for June 
and July 1999 to eliminate investments that may have been moved up one month and I 
dropped observations for December 1999 and January 2000 to control for investments 
that may have been shifted from December 1999 to the following month.  Regression 
results were not affected by dropping those observations.31   
                                                 
31 I experimented with longer windows but the Tobit regressions did not converge.  Longer windows may 
not be appropriate anyway.  Moving investment forward in time is very difficult given bottlenecks in 
production and delaying a project is quite costly given the capital costs that have been incurred prior to 
start-up.  Flexibility in project timing on short notice, therefore, is quite limited. 
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Table 10. Capacity Investment Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
dependent 
variable capacity capacity capacity capacity 
capacity/ 
mile2 
capacity/ 
mile2 
capacity/ 
mile2 
capacity/ 
mile2 
 OLS Tobit Tobit Tobit OLS Tobit Tobit Tobit 
user cost of 
capital 
-273.2 
(227.6) 
-1064.5 
(311.5) 
-1253.1 
(346.8) 
-1641.3 
(382.9) 
-4.89 
(3.71) 
-14.40 
(3.84) 
-16.60 
(4.35) 
-23.54 
(4.60) 
RPS dummy 13.5 (11.2) 
6.4 
(12.7) 
30.8 
(8.5) 
49.0 
(9.2) 
0.07 
(0.11) 
-.07 
(0.16) 
0.22 
(0.11) 
0.36 
(0.10) 
state fixed 
effects yes yes no no yes yes no no 
region fixed 
effects no no yes no no no yes no 
R2 0.232 0.128 0.139 0.081 0.181 0.340 0.339 0.209 
Number of 
observations 1065 723 1065 1065 1065 723 1065 1065 
All regressions include year effects.  Robust standard errors are reported.  For the Tobit regressions pseudo-R2s are reported. 
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 Let me next turn to a discussion of interpretation of the estimated coefficients on 
the user cost variable in the Tobit regressions.  As I noted above Tobit coefficient 
estimates cannot be directly compared to OLS estimates.  We need to adjust the former to 
obtain marginal impacts that are comparable to coefficients in the OLS model.32 
 The adjustment to estimated coefficient can be computed in a number of ways.  If 
I compute the CDF at the mean values of the right hand side variables, I obtain an 
estimate of the partial effect at the average (PEA).  Alternatively I can compute the CDF 
at the observed values of all the observations and take the average.  This is the average 
partial effect (APE).  I report both for the regression in column 2 of Table 10.  The partial 
effect at the average equals -323.13 while the average partial effect equals -417.33.  
These two estimates are both substantially larger than the OLS coefficient estimate on the 
user cost variable in the first column.  In other words, running OLS leads to a large 
underestimate of the tax impact on investment. 
 The average user cost of capital in the sample equals 4.57%.  This rises to 7.77% 
if the production tax credit is eliminated.  This implies a decline in annual average 
investment of 10.3 MW if the partial effect at the average is used and 13.4 MW if the 
average partial effect is used.  These declines represent 71 and 92 percent of average 
investment over the sample suggesting the production tax credit plays a very substantial 
role in wind investment.33 
                                                 
32  The marginal impact is given by ( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛Φ=∂
∂
σβ
xβx
j
it
ijt
x
YE |  where xβ  is the predicted value of the 
dependent variable from the Tobit regression, σ  is the estimated standard error from the regression and 
Φ  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.   See, for example, Wooldridge (2009). 
33  For this calculation, I compute the average over the entire sample as opposed to conditioning on positive 
investment as in Table 8. 
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 Another way to measure the impact of tax policy on investment is to measure the 
elasticity of investment with respect to the user cost.  Using the PEA, the elasticity at the 
mean is -1.01.  It equals -1.30 if the APE is used.  Either way, the response is large. 
 The effects are even larger if we control for the size of the state.  Using the 
coefficient estimates from column (6), the average partial effect is -7.18 and the partial 
effect on average is -8.09.  Again these are considerably larger than the OLS impact.  
Raising the user cost of capital from 4.57% to 7.77% to model the elimination of the 
production tax credit implies a decline in investment of 0.23 MW per 1000 square miles 
based on the APE and 0.25 MW per 1000 square miles based on the PEA.  Both of these 
declines exceed the mean investment per 1000 square miles in the overall sample (0.16 
MW per 1000 square miles).  The elasticity at the mean is -2.37 using the partial effect at 
the average and -2.11 using the average partial effects. 
 With sufficiently strong assumptions we can make a ballpark estimate of the 
impact of carbon pricing on investment in wind capacity.  Consider the year effects as 
graphed in Figure 6 against natural gas prices.  If we make the strong assumption that the 
year effects are perfectly proxying for natural gas price effects on investment, we can 
compute an elasticity of capacity investment with respect to natural gas prices.  Using the 
doubling of gas prices between 1990 and 2004 and computing the average partial effect 
for the marginal impact we obtain an elasticity of investment with respect to the natural 
gas price of 1.7.  A recent analysis of the Waxman-Markey bill by the U. S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (2009) suggests that the price of permits in 2020 will 
be $16.31 (Scenario 2 of the ADAGE run).  This will raise natural gas prices by 8.5 
percent relative to the reference scenario.  Based on my elasticity estimate, this would 
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raise investment in wind capacity by 14 percent.34  The ADAGE analysis reports an 
increase in wind capacity investment of 9 percent by 2020.35   My estimate is higher than 
the ADAGE estimate but reasonably close given the simplifying assumptions my analysis 
makes.  While my estimate is admittedly very rough, it suggests that wind investment 
should be quite responsive to carbon pricing. 
 The regression estimates in this section show a strong response of wind 
investment to changes in tax policy.  They also suggest that production tax credits 
strongly influence wind investment.  These findings support the received wisdom that 
production tax credits are critically important for the penetration of wind generated 
electricity in the United States.  It also suggests that we will continue to see considerable 
support for this credit as we approach the end of 2012 and the credit's expiration.   
 It should be noted, however, that the econometric results here depend critically on 
the assumptions of the Tobit model in a data set with a large fraction of censored 
observations.  It would be valuable to subject the wind capacity data to more 
sophisticated econometric techniques to see if the results found here are robust.  This is 
especially the case given the lack of other empirical work measuring the impact of 
renewable investment behavior to energy tax and climate policy.   
V. Conclusion 
 The federal tax code has historically played a major role in shaping U.S. energy 
policy.  Tax-based subsidies account for nearly two-thirds of all federal financial support 
for energy markets (U.S. Energy Information Administration (2008a)) in 2007.  As 
                                                 
34   Given the estimated standard error on the 2004 year effect and conditional on mean wind capacity, the 
standard error of the elasticity estimate is 0.6.  For an 8.5 percent increase in the price of natural gas this 
suggests a one standard deviation bracket of this estimated increase in wind capacity between 9.4 and 20.0 
percent.   
35  They actually report estimates for wind and solar.  But the bulk of this capacity is likely to be wind. 
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detailed in this paper the tax provisions are complex and constantly in flux.  Currently, 
for example, wind developers may receive a production tax credit or investment tax credit 
or cash rebate comparable to the investment tax credit.  The wind credits, however, 
expire at the end of 2012 in the absence of further government action.  At the same time, 
Congress is currently considering enacting climate change legislation which will 
dramatically affect energy markets. 
 While much as been written on the various tax subsidies to energy, less is known 
about their impact on investment and production.  This paper contributes to that literature 
by considering the impact of taxes on wind investment.  I find that investment in new 
capacity (measured in megawatts) is strongly influenced by tax policy.  The estimated 
elasticity of capacity investment with respect to the user cost of capital exceeds one.  
Moreover the data suggest that much of the current investment in wind can be explained 
by the production tax credit for wind.   
 An important question for Congress and the Administration going forward is 
whether it makes sense to maintain many of the tax-based subsidies if comprehensive 
climate change legislation is enacted.  Elsewhere I have noted a number of problems with 
a subsidy-based approach to energy policy (see Metcalf (2009a)).  An important question 
for future research is whether carbon pricing through a cap and trade bill or carbon fee 
can generate comparable levels of investment as the current tax-based subsidies.  While 
economic principles suggest it should (if designed at comparable levels), it will be 
important to test this empirically.   
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